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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

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5 DEC 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

At the close of the Executive Committee Meeting last night, I raised the question of courses of action we should follow if the Cuban SAM sites are made operational and a U-2 is shot down. This question has been considered and the consensus seems to be that in such an eventuality, we will be obliged to take out the SAM site or perhaps several SAM sites. There appeared no difference of opinion among those in attendance at the meeting last night or previous meetings when I raised this question concerning the policy.


However, as you said, the implementation of the "policy" was another matter and perhaps it would be more difficult to "seize the nettle" in such assumed circumstance than it is to agree among ourselves as to what should be done.

I continue to be disturbed over this situation as I feel that there is a strong possibility of such a confrontation as soon as the IL-28's are all removed. In this connection, I find it significant that Mr. Kuznetsov advised Governor Stevenson with regard to the number of IL-28's to be shipped on each of several ships, the ports and the dates of departure. This seems to indicate to me that the Soviets are about to "drop the curtain" on one phase of the Cuban problem.

Other indications of their intentions have appeared recently. On Monday I gave you a note reporting (by Stevenson) Mikoyan's statements that "he had succeeded in maintaining a Socialist 'communist-controlled' state in Cuba." I also reported that we had detected a continual improvement in Soviet-controlled communications systems throughout the Island.

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*Today, the Watch Committee reports more extensively on the communications developments and their report, which appears as an Annex to this week's Watch Committee statement, is attached.

I feel there is a very strong possibility that we will soon face a situation where the Soviets will first warn us against further overflights, indicate that their SAM sites are in operation, and if we persist will destroy one or more U-2's. Action by us of a type planned and mentioned last night could, therefore, involve a military operation against announced Soviet controlled and operated bases and thus involve action against Soviet soldiers.

This therefore is quite possibly the situation that we will face. It will not be action against "Cuban forces" in disguise; it will be action against Soviet forces and this may possibly be announced to us in advance. I bring this up because I think the possibility must be given serious thought at this time and we might devise diplomatic moves which would either forestall such a confrontation or, alternatively, a pronouncement made now might so indicate our intentions that the confrontation will not occur.


JOHN A. McCONE
Director

Attachment

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5 December 1962

SPECIAL ANNEX

To Watch Report of the United States Intelligence Board

1. This Annex, prepared by the NSA, is concerned solely with the possible command structure of Soviet military forces in Cuba and does not bear on the possible number of Soviet military personnel in Cuba. Soviet communications in Cuba appear to reflect a senior Soviet military authority in the Havana area who controls Soviet ground, naval, air and air defense elements in Cuba, with direct communications facilities between this authority and the Ministry of Defense in Moscow.

2. Evidence suggests that the Soviet military forces remaining in Cuba may represent a formation with the command structure of an organization directly subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and comparable in command composition (although not in strength) to other Soviet armed forces elements outside the USSR proper. These Soviet communications indicate that the command structure within Cuba is comparable to that of a Soviet Group of Forces. This hypothesis is based on the totality of Sigint evidence available to date, and the comparison of communications activity and communications equipment usage.

3. Previous Sigint reports have indicated the widespread use of Soviet communications procedures and call-signs, Soviet scrambler communications within Cuba and between Cuba and the USSR, the appearance of an address representing the Ministry of Defense, in communications between Cuba and USSR, the use of Soviet high-grade literal and digital cryptographic systems, the use of Soviet multi-channel VHF and UHF systems, and the continued appearance in communications of references to high-level Soviet military personalities in Cuba.

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